Officially recorded silver production at Potosí fell gradually between 1550, which is the first year in which there is adequate information about output, and the early 1570's. Production in 1550 has been estimated at 379,244 marks; in 1572 it was only 114,878 marks. After 1572, however, the silver output of Potosí rose remarkably fast, to reach what was probably an all-time peak in 1592, at 887,448 marks. The most abrupt increase took place in the middle and later years of the 70's. In 1580 production was already 668,517 marks -an almost six-fold increase over the nadir of 1572 1 . How is this enormous expansion of output to be, accounted for? Two major stimulants of the boom have been identified by historians: the organisation of a new labour system for the Potosí industry, and the introduction of a new refining process. The new labour system was the mita -a draft labour sdieme designed to bring to Potosí some 13,400 male Indian workers annually. The scheme was arranged in such a way that a third of these should be working in the extraction and refining of ore at any one moment 2 . The new refining process was amalgamation -use of the propensity of mercury to combine with
silver in order to extract silver from ores 3 . There can be no doubt that these two innovations alone were the major reasons for the Potosí boom of the late sixteenth century. This article examines the introduction of the amalgamation process into Potosí, and some structural changes in the silver industry that occurred rapidly and inevitably once amalgamation arrived. If the new refining process and the new labour system can be ranked according to the impact they had on the Potosí industry, then amalgamation must come before the mita. Without the capacity to refine poor ores that amalgamation gave to Potosí, enlarging the labour force would have been of little use. Enormous amounts of ore might well have been mined by the thousands of forced workers coming to Potosí in the mita. But given the depleted state of the mines of Potosí by the early 1570's, the majority of those ores would have been of poor quality, and the smelting techniques used previously to refine the early and richer ores would have been inadequate to the task of producing silver from them. The introduction of amalgamation to Potosí therefore deserves treatment separate from discussion of the mita. An adequate discussion of the mita, moreover, entails not only an examination of forced labour in the limited economic context of the mining industry, but also a consideration of the system's social consequences in Potosí and over a vast area of the Andean altiplano. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of an article.
The revival of Potosí in the 1570's has often been seen as the work of a single man -Francisco de Toledo, viceroy of Peru from 1568 to 1580. Toledo was the fifth viceroy of Peru, but is generally and cor-*) The amalgamation process, as used in Spanish America, is generally, though incorrectly, known as the patio process (this name applying only to amalgamation carried out on a large open-air paved yard). There is a large literature, both ancient and modern, on the process. A good survey of Spanish colonial amalgamation can be found in the Tercera parte (pp. 107-200) of Modesto Bargalló's La minería y la metalurgia en la América española durante la ¿poca colonial, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, D. F., 1955 . B a r g a 11 6 has more recently expanded his history of amalgamation with a large volume of printed manuscript sources on the subject: La amalgamación de los minerales de plata en Hispanoamérica colonial, Compañía Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey, México, D. F., 1969. For a seventeenth century account of amalgamation in Potosí, see the work of Alvaro Alonso Barba, the master metallurgist of colonial Spanish America: Arte de los metales, en que se enseña el verdadero beneficio de los de oro y plata por azogue ... (1st. ed. Madrid 1640, and later eds. in Spanish, the most recent being that of Potosí 1967, annotated by Armando Alba. An English translation exists, by R. E. Douglas and E. P. Machewson, N. Y. 1923). rectly seen an the royal officer who established Spanish colonial control, with all its bureaucratic and legal trappings, over much of South America. He is undoubtedly a prime figure in Potosi's history, though his reforms there were not entirely personal initiatives. He was implementing instructions given by his king, Philip II, who told him, before he left Spain, to organise forced Indian mine labour in Peru and to go into the possibilities of introducing amalgamation there. Philip II is renowned for his attention to the minutiae of government; but it is still curious to find him, as Toledo relates, instructing his new viceroy of Peru, in a personal interview in Madrid, in the technical steps that must be taken to increase royal income from the Peruvian silver mines: Toledo shall establish royal ownership over the tailings (desmontes) discarded in the past, and shall make efforts to have them refined with mercury 4 . Philip doubtless had in mind the success of amalgamation in Mexico, where the process had for the first time in history been developed on an industrial scale in the mid 1550's. And the king was right to stress the importance of the tailings, since amalgamation was ideally suited to refining the poorer ores contained in them -ores, moreover, that were plentiful and already mined, and therefore a potential source of quick returns. Tailings were indeed to make a large contribution to Potosi's success in the mid 1570's.
With these directives, Toledo went to Peru, arriving in late 1569 after almost a year of journeying. He did not begin to attend seriously to mining problems until he set off on his long and famous inspection of the viceroyalty of Peru in October 1570. He found that the Potosi mines had, almost from their discovery in 1545, been worked by a mixture of forced and voluntary Indian labourers. The volunteers, who were numerous, had been attracted to the mines by the profits they could make from extracting and processing the early rich ores. But these ores had been depleted to such an extent that Toledo saw no hope of there again being enough voluntary labour to restore Potosí to prosperity. So, apparently with some hesitation (despite the king's orders on the matter), but no less energy for that, he set about the task of constructing a draft labour system. The practical arranging of the mita system took place in late 1572, as Toledo travelled south from Cuzco to Potosí. Passing through the Indian towns of the altiplano, he ordered that each should send to Potosí annually about a seventh of its able-bodied male population. Once in Potosí, Toledo organised the housing of these people, and their distribution among Spanish mine and refinery owners 5 . Toledo had begun preliminary enquiries into the amalgamation question while still in Lima. He found that the process had been tried in Potosí, but had been rejected as unsuited to the ores found there. The question of why amalgamation had not spread rapidly from Mexico to Peru, and particularly to Potosí, after its widespread adoption in Mexico during the late 1550's, is an intriguing one. A Portuguese miner in Peru, Enrique Garcés, had been sent by the Peruvian administration to Mexico in 1558 to learn the mercury process developed there. Returning to Peru, he produced silver with mercury in 1559, refining ores from various mines. But his experiments did not lead to wide use of the process 6 . Mercury trials in Potosí are reported from 1564 on; but were accounted failures 7 . In Potosí, at least, there would seem to be no fundamental technical reason for the failure of the process. The common Potosí silver ores of the time -the 1560'swere oxides, which were the common class of ore found also in Mexico. , that for most of the period before Toledo's coming, Potosí mine owners saw little to be gained by introducing processing with mercury. Various accounts of mining and refining in Potosí before Toledo state that both these operations were in the hands of Indians, and that the Spanish owners had very little part in them. AsCapoche describes the system 9 , Spanish mine owners made agreements with free acting Indians (indios ventureros) for the working of mines, assigning to each sudi Indian a certain number of varas (a linear measure of about 33 inches) in the mine. These Indians, who voluntarily approached the owners to make such agreements, were therefore known as indios varas. The rich ore that they extracted was to go to the mine owners; but the owner normally sold this ore back to the indio vara, who automatically took all the poorer ore he extracted as well. The Indian would then refine the ore by smelting it in a guaira. This was a furnace of native Peruvian design, commonly built in some explosed place where the wind would blow it. C a p o c h e, with others who left similar accounts 10 , implies that the bulk of the profit from this arrangement of mining and refining went to the Indian. The Spanish mine owner was content with the silver he received in payment for the ore from his mine -an income entailing no expenditure of effort. Clearly, the mine owner, offered such easy gain, would have little enthusiasm for amalgamation, which was an unfamiliar process demanding large investment in processing plant, as well as the acquisition of new skills.
) Toledo refers at length in his reports
Toledo reported to the king in February 1570, from Lima, that many skilled men (hartos maestros) and miners had come to him with new inventions for smelting and amalgamating silver ores. Many were locals; others were from Spain. (So reads the copy of this letter in the Archive of the Indies. What would really be expected in the context is New Spain; and an omission may be suspected.) He proposed to test their schemes and devices 11 . From Cuzco, early in 1572, he reported that mercury processing had begun in some small mines 12 . The first definite sign of amalgamation in Potosí so far revealed by research is a contract for building two silver refining plants (ingenios), dated 9 January 1572 13 . Then signs of the rapid adoption of the new method follow thick and fast. In Mardi 1572 the town council assigned a site inside the town for the construction of a water driven amalgamation ingenio 1 *. In May 1572 the council noted that the value of mines was rising because of the spread of amalgamation, and that previously abandoned mines were being "rediscovered" 18 . By late 1572, the Audiencia of Charcas reported, most miners in Potosí and the province of Charcas generally had taken up the mercury process. The Audiencia expected that many people from outside Charcas would now move into the province, because it was full of silver ores. Many ingenios were being built 1 ®. This is only a small selection from the reports made in 1572 showing rapid growth in amalgamation in that year.
Toledo himself played a major part in establishing the new process in Potosí, even though he did not arrive there until 23 December 1572 17 . In a long letter to the king, dated Cuzco, 1 March 1572, he described, among other things, his efforts to stimulate mining at PolJ ) Toledo to Philip II, Lima 8 February 1570 (Le villi er, Gobernantes..., tomo 3, pp. 330-31). 18 . He emphasised the decayed state of the silver industry there, and the measures he had taken to remedy that situation: first the organisation of draft labour and the encouragement of mercury mining at Huancavelica. Then, in paragraph 46 of his report, Toledo introduces a famous figure in the history of Potosí, Pedro Hernández de Velasco, the man usually held to have found the key to amalgamation in Potosí. "Recently", wrote Toledo, "there arrived at this Audiencia [Lima] a Spaniard from Mexico, a poor man, who says his name is Pedro Hernández; and he is no less [poor] in understanding, for he does not possess it for anything besides what he does. He arrived with a sharp {agudo) companion, who understands that which lies within the simplicity of this other (i. e. Hernández), and this companion, with many protestations of secrecy, and [requests] that I should give him and Hernández a reward (merced), offered to reveal to me how the great majority of the ores of this land could be refined with mercury". Hernández and his companion asked Toledo to provide them with a secret room in his house for twenty days, and a selection of ores from Potosí. There they would perform trials in the presence of Toledo and a witness to be chosen by him. These trials were carried out, says Toledo, though he does not give the results. They must, though, have been promising, since he goes on to say that he has sent Hernández to Potosí to carry out secret trials on the spot, particularly with tailings 19 . Once in Cuzco, Toledo again conducted secret experiments with Potosí tailings, employing a skilled man (hombre hábil) to do them. Who this was, he does not say. It may well have been Hernández himself, since there are later reports from miners of Potosí that Hernández was carrying out amalgamation experiments there before he approached Toledo with his methods 20 . If this is so, the secret of Hernández' initial demonstrations to Toledo in Lima was evidently well kept. Whether or not Hernández was the experimenter in Cuzco, it was he who carried off Toledo's reward for the successful amalgamation of Potosí ores. On 7 February 1572 Toledo, in Cuzco, issued an order to the royal Treasury officials of Potosí to pay Pedro Hernández an annual salary of 400 pesos ensayados as the "chief master of mercury" in that town 21 . This oder mentions that Hernández 4 articulate companion was one Graviel Zapata, and that the pair had made successful trials with the tailing of Potosí, as well as with newly mined ores. Hernández' job in Potosí was to teach his methods to Spaniards and Indians.
Since, according to Toledo himself, mercury was being used in early 1571 to refine silver in some Peruvian mines, it is probable that Hernández was not the only experimenter in Potosí. No record has come to light to show just when he went to Potosí, nor when he began to make his methods public; so it is impossible to say if he was the inspiration of the two mercury ingenios described in the January 15 72 building contract, referred to above. It is at least likely that he was not, because the notion of amalgamation was obviously much in the air at the time, as a consequence of the decline of Potosí and the search for a new way of profiting from mining. It is interesting to find the Audiencia of Charcas in November 1572 referring to the amalgamation of tailings at Potosí in a report to the king, but attributing this initiative to "som private persons", with nary a mention of Toledo or of Hernández 22 . This omission should probably not, however, be taken at face value. It may well be a manifestation of the antipathy of the Audiencia towards Toledo, who was no more popular with the judges of Charcas than he was with those of Lima. A few months earlier the viceroy had complained to the president of the Council of the Indies that the Audiencia of Charcas was resisting the coming of amalgamation, because it had had no part in the introduction of the process itself 23 mation. In March 1573 he sent an extensive report on his activities to the king 24 . The letter is sanguine in tone. Potosí, he said, had previously been exploited by men who looked for a quick return and had no intention of settling down there. But now mercury processing, which demanded water and horse driven machinery and other costly expenditure, was making people take root in the town. He estimated that over 300,000 pesos [presumably of plata ensayada] had been spent on processing plant for amalgamation. Over 700 Spaniards, he thought, were now resident in Potosí. (This figure probably referred to men only, and particularly to those engaged in mining and refining.) The Indians conscripted under his new draft labour system were beginning to arrive. He was reorganising and enlarging the Indian section of Potosí to accomodate them, creating new parishes, building new diurches, seeing to religious instruction. The qualms he seems to have felt over the massive upheaval of the altiplano population that he had engineered were allayed by his observation that there were many Indian children in Potosí. Nowhere else, he wrote, had he seen so many Indian children born. The Indians were, he thought, also now beginning to appreciate the profit they could have in Potosí by taking to processing by mercury. In each parish Toledo had set up an amalgamation school, in which Indian masters, already trained by Hernández de Velasco, instructed the newcomers in the new technique. He had also ordered that numerous guairas -6,600 of them, carefully counted -should be left in place on the Cerro 25 of Potosí, so that Indians could continue to refine by the old smelting method during the windy winter months 26 . His plan seems to have been that Indian workers should be paid partly or wholly in ore, as they had been in earlier decades; though he soon set up a system of cash wages. Initially, however, there can be no doubt that he intended Indians to use amalgamation to produce silver on their own account and so, with some continuation of smelting during the winter, profit substantially from their obligatory stay in Potosí. Given the high investment in plant necessary for amalgamation, and the general decline in ore ") Toledo to Philip II, Potosí 20 Mardi 1573 (AGI Lima 29, vol. 1). **) The small mountain towering over Potosí to the south and containing the great majority of the mines from whidi the Potosí industry drew its ores.
") Toledo, like other Spaniards, called Pocosf's wet season the winter -whereas it is strictly speaking the summer, running from late November to March. The winter months of June-August are dry, cold and very windy. quality, it is most unlikely that any draft labourers did make much profit.
In early 1572, while still in Cuzco, Toledo sent an official to Potosí to survey the tailings of ore, discarded on the Cerro at the mouths of mines. He forbade the mine owners to work these tailings, and put them in the possession of the Treasury officers of Potosí. At this point he was contemplating the creation of some royal mining enterprise which should monopolise the production of silver by amalgamation of tailings; though he had misgivings over the cost of such a scheme 27 . Moreover, the owners of the mines from which the tailings had come naturally enough raised objections to this confiscation. When he reached Potosí, Toledo decid ad that direct Crown participation in refining was impracticable, because of local opposition and high cost. The king would do far better financially by taking the standard fifth on silver production from private refiners than he would by running refineries himself. Toledo did, however, place the distribution under royal monopoly, so that the sale price of this essential ingredient in amalgamation could be manipulated to ensure an income to the Crown. He also reported that he had concelled a standing royal order for the export of mercury from Peru to Mexico, so as to provide an ample supply to Potosí and other Peruvian centres 28 . The amalgamation process rested on the chemical properties of mercury. But these could not be exploited unless the silver ore to be refined were first milled to a fine powder. The speed with which amalgamation was adopted in Potosí can be measured by the rate at which refineries, containing milling apparatus, were built; and this is well shown in a document of about 1576 which lists the refineries then extant, or under construction, in and near the town. 30 . The Copia refers to crushing mills driven by man-power, by animals and by water: ingenios de pie, ingenios de caballo, ingenios de agua. The only further differentiation made, beyond these three basic types, is that some of the ingenios de caballo have stamps, and a few a millstone (piedra). It is likely that both horses and mules were subsumed under the general convenience term caballo, since in other, admittedly later, mining centres of Spanish America, the mule was the animal commonly used for driving mills.
C a p o c h e, however, indicates a wider range of machines 81 . The first mills built, he says, were foot powered. (Here, presumably, Indians were put to work in a treadmill.) Other mills of the same early period were hand powered. A third type of human powered mill is mentioned by Capoche as being de grúa (with a crane). It is not clear how this worked. He distinguishes two sorts of animal powered mill: one like a gypsum mill (molino de yeso), which was in all probability equipped with two round horizontal millstones, set one on top of the other, one rotating and the other stationary, with the ore being ground between them; and another in which the animals drove stamps, through a cog mechanism (con ciertas ruedas). Then, according to Capoche, there were two types of water powered mill. First, one de rodezno de alavés -a horizontal water wheel arranged like a turbine to be struck at a tangent by a strong jet of water. The wheel would be set below the millstones, one of which rotated against the other stationary one, as in the gypsum mill. The water wheel and the rotating stone were mounted on a common shaft, so that both revolved at the same speed. This type of mill can still be found in use near Potosí. The other type of water mill was one with a large vertical wheel, driving stamps through gearing. (This was the only type of water mill mentioned in the Copia.) C a p o c h e noted that by the time of his Relación (ca. 1585), only animal and water powered mills remained. The reasons for the disappearance of man powered mills will become clear below.
The total number of mills in operation shown by the Copia is 108. These were equiped, between them, with 949 stamps and 7 millstones. The following table shows the numbers of mills in each of the three basic categories, the number of stamps and millstones in each category, and the milling capacity of each type of mill, as calculated from data in the Copia. It is unfortunate that so many mills are of unspecified type. On the other hand, to judge from the average number of stamps in them, and their average milling capacities, there can be little doubt that they were human powered (ingenios de pie).
In addition to these 108 functioning mills, there were, at the time of the Copia, 39 more under construction. Table II gives some information about these. *) This is the mean for the 4 mills for which the number of stamps is given. *) This is the mean for the 8 mills for which the number of stamps is given. *) This is the mean for the 9 mills for which the number of stamps is given. The total number of stamps being installed in water driven mills may therefore be over 170.
A trend away from building ingenios de pie and towards animal and water powered mills is already clearly shown by this table.
The Copia shows all ingenios de pie, all unspecified mills, and all but one of the animal powered mills to have been sited in Potosi itself. Clearly this was a convenient place for them -close to the mines in the Cerro from which the ores came, close to the source of labour, and close to the owners' town dwellings. Power for these mills, in the form of men and animals, could be brought to them. But hydraulic power could not so easily be brought to Potosi. True, it was supplied to many water driven ingenios within the town by the end of the sixteenth century; but that was only after many years of dam building in the ranges above Potosi, and after the costly construction of canals to lead water from the reservoirs to the wheels of the refineries. In the mid 1570's, though, there was only rather a slight stream flowing through the town and in consequence only two of the fifteen water powered ingenios working at the time of the Copia were located inside the town. Three more were being built there. The following table shows the sites of water driven mills as the Copia relates them. These sites offered a good supply of running water the whole year round. The most popular of them, Tarapaya, seems to have comprised, in the sixteenth century, several river valleys close by Potosí to the north and west: the valley still known as Tarapaya, together with other valleys in which the modern villages of Santa Lucia, Cayara and Chiracoro are sited. All these have streams eventually draining into the Pilcomayo. The Tarapaya area had the advantage of being within 10-15 kilometres of Potosí and quite easy of access. The valley floors are some 600 metres lower than the town centre, and offer correspondingly higher temperatures, which should have tended to accelerate the amalgamation reactions -though it is doubtful whether this would have been appreciated as early as 1576. The constant flow of water was the attraction then. Mataca and Pilcomayo are both names of rivers in the Potosí vicinity. The Pilcomayo is the major stream of the area, into which many smaller rivers flow. Its waters eventually join those of the Paraguay. Nowhere does the course of the river now called the Pilcomayo come closer than 30 kilometres to Potosí (to the north); so the ingenio built on the Pilcomayo, assuming there has been no change of name, was far from the source of ore. The Mataca (which flows into the Pilcomayo some 70 kilometres to the north-east of Potosí) rises about 20 kilometres to the east of the town; and ingenios sited on it must also have been rather inaccessible. The preference for the Tarapaya zone demonstrated in Table III is therefore easily explained.
With the date provided in the Copia about values of ingenios, in-teresting comparisons may be made between the costs of the three basic types of mill. In the following two tables, some mean values are shown. Table IV (a) gives means for all the ingenios assigned a value in the Copia. Some of these ingenios had mines associated with them, and others not. The mean values in Table IV (a) therefore in part reflect the value of mines attached to mills 32 . In Table IV (b) are ! ) Includes 5 mills still being built, for which values are given. *) Animal powered mills with matos are worth 276,850 pesos', those with millstones, 89,000 pesos. These mills have either stamps or a millstone. None has more than one stone. 4 ) Includes 8 water driven mills still being built, but almost finished. 5 ) Animal driven mills with stamps are worth 70,750 pesos \ those with millstones, 29,100 pesos. There are only 2 with stones. e ) Includes 2 water driven mills still being built, but almost finished. Each has 8 stamps.
**) As may be seen by comparing Tables IV (a) and (b), among the 63 ingenios shown the mean values of ingenios apparently without mines attached to them. It is posible only to say "apparently", as the Copia does not state categorically that these 31 ingenios were without mines; but rather merely fails to mention any mines in connection with them.
The differences in value among the three basic types of mill are quite clear, no matter whether all ingenios are considered, as in Table IV (a), or just those not having mines attached to them, as in Table IV (b). The least valuable was the ingenio de pie; considerably higher in value was the ingenio de caballo-, and very much higher was the in- ') The method is to multiply the number of stamps (or fraction of a stamp) needed to mill a quintal of ore in 24 hours (Table I, last column) by the mean cost of a stamp (Table IV ( b) , last column). For the purposes of greater accuracy in this table, the mean fraction of a quintal milled per 24 hours by one stamp of a man powered mill has been calculated to four significant figures (0,8517) instead of the two shown in Table I . The values of mills used in these calculations are those of mills without mines, as in Table IV (b) . The numbers of sudi mills are rather small (13 de pie, 10 de caballo, 8 de agua), so that conclusions may be statistically doubtful. But similar results emerge if the values of the larger numbers of mills both with and without mines (Table IV (a)) are used: ingenios de pie, 838.4 pesos-, ingenios de caballos with stamps, 733.4 pesos-, ingenios de caballos with millstone, 946.6 pesos; ingenios de agua, 174.4 pesos. The only striking increase in unit milling capacity cost to be found here, in comparison with costs in mills without mines, is in the case of the animal driven mills using stamps: a rise from 442.0 to 733.4 pesos in the cost of installing plant able to mill one quintal in 24 hours. This suggests that particularly valuable or extensive mines were associated with animal powered mills.
! ) Pesos of plata ensayada, of 450 maravedís.
3 ) This calculation is made with only two millstones, so that the significance of the cost estimate is very slight. whose value is known, 4 ingenios de pie had mines, of a total of 17; 13 ingenios de caballo had mines, of a total of 23; and 15 ingenios de agua had mines, of a total of 23.
genio de agua. These differences are clear in the mean values of the mills; and more distinct still in the mean values of a stamp in each type of mill.
There is probably little risk of distortion in regarding the values given in the Copia as the equivalents of the cost of acquiring an ingenio at the time, either by purchase or by new building 33 . If this cost is then compared with the milling capacity of the different types of ingenio, quite wide variations in the cost-effectiveness of the three basic types emerge. These are shown in Table V . The superior economy of the water driven mill in comparison with the other two types is dramatically shown here. In the ingenio de agua the unit installation cost of milling capacity was far less than half that in an ingenio de caballos using stamps, and about a fifth of that in an ingenio de pie. The unit milling-capacity cost of an ingenio de caballos with millstone, as shown here, may be misleading, as the Copia supplies the necessary data for only two such mills. But if those data are at all representative, then that type of mill was extremely expensive to acquire, given its low productive capacity: more expensive, even, than the ingenio de pie.
The Copia unfortunately supplies no information from which the running costs of the mills may be calculated. But it does give the number of Indians assigned to the ingenios\ and by comparing that number with milling capacity, some estimates of labour productivity can be made.
The significance of these figures is certainly suspect to an extent, because it is impossible to know whether the number of Indians mentioned by the Copia as being attached to a mill was the total number employed in it. But again the difference between the ingenio de agua and the other two types is so striking that a real distinction seems likely to have existed. If the productivity of labour in the water driven mill was indeed higher than in the other mills, then the running costs of the ingenio de agua would also seem likely to have been sub- stantially lower than those of other types, per unit of ore milled, since labour costs were a sizeable part of total running costs. It is highly probable, then, that the water powered refining mill offered great advantages over the other two types in cheapness of installation of milling capacity and in productivity of labour. This explains why more such mills were being built in and around Potosí at the time of the Copia than any other type. It explains Capoche's remark that no ingenio de pie were being built in his timethe early 1580's. The ingenio de caballos survived in Potosí until the early years of the seventeenth century, to judge from references in notarial and other documents. After that, the water ingenio monopolised the field. By the end of the sixteenth century the series of .reservoirs above Potosí had been extended to the point where in most years they could store enough water to drive mills throughout the dry winter and spring season. The animal powered mill had owed its survial to lack of water power in those months. Once year-round water was to be had, it went the way of the ingenio de pie.
The account of Potosí refineries given by the Copia makes it possible to understand how miners contrived to build the plant demanded by the amalgamation process, starting as they did from the midst of a mining depression in the early 1570's. The Copia shows that the earliest mills constructed were ingenios de pie-, then followed ingenios de caballo; and finally the water powered mills were built. This, at least, was the overall progression. The ingenio de pie was cheap to build (see Table IV (a) and (b)), though costly to run. In the initial stages of the amalgamation revolution at Potosí, economy of construction was probably the most important consideration. Tailings are likely to have been rich enough to offset the high milling costs of the man powered mill. Profits so earned were then, it seems, reinvested in larger, animal powered, mills. These, though dearer to build, gave a better return on investment. For a given sum spent on plant, they would mill almost twice as much ore as an ingenio de pie (Table V) , provided stamps, and not millstones, were chosen. The profit and investment cycle would then repeat, enabling refiners to advance to the ingenio de agua -a process that was clearly proceeding apace at the time of the Copia, since water refineries were being built in larger numbers than other types (Table II) . The increase in investment demanded by the change, from animal power to water power was far greater than that implied in the move from man power to animal power (Table IV ( b) ). But the improvement in returns, in the form of augmented milling capacity per peso invested and probably of better labour productivity, more than offset the increased building costs (Tables V and VI ).
The first five or six years of amalgamation in Potosí were, therefore, years of rapid capital formation and of rapid improvements in the efficiency of the milling stage of the refining process. Capital formation was greatly aided by the presence of tailings in large quantity -ores whose extraction costs had, as it were, been paid long before. Much of this material, though previously discarded as too poor for smelting in guairas, must have been of good quality, at least in comparison with ores refined in later decades at Potosí. The tailings were almost exhausted by the later 70's. Some valuable discarded material still remained inside mine workings, and was being used by late 1577 s4 . But this cost a certain amount to extract; and the mining of new ores, which was becoming necessary by the end of the 70's, was more costly still. By that time, however, the majority of milling capacity in and near Potosí is likely to have been in ingenios de agua, so that higher extraction costs were offset by lower processing costs. In this way the upward movement of silver production was maintained during the 1580's, though at a lower rate of growth than in the mid and late 70's. Upward movement of output was also maintained through improvements in the actual process of amalgamation in the 1580's -a topic which needs separate attention. By the early 1590's, it seems, the cost of extracting ores had risen, and the quality of ores had declined, to the point where the earlier improvements made in milling and amalgamation were cancelled out. In the 90's, silver production levelled off, and then, even before 1600, began the slow downward movement that characterises the whole seventeenth century in Potosi.
The rapidity of capital formation in the refining section of the silver industry during the early 1570's can be appreciated by comparing the total value of the refineries built with silver output. The following table gives estimates of total values. ') Pesos of plata ensayada of 450 maravedís. Total values are calculated by multiplying the total number of mills in each of the three classes by the mean value in each class.
I. e. built and under construction, as in Tables I and II. Total silver output in Potosí for the years 1571 to 1576, inclusive, has been estimated at 1,108,587 marks, or 5,863,193.5 pesos de plata ensayada™. Royalties and assay dues on this output were levied at a total rate of 20.8 %>, thus taking from producers 1,219,544 pesos, and leaving them a net return of 4,643,649 pesos. If it is assumed, as is quite reasonable from internal evidence in the Copia, that the ingenios it lists were built in the years 1571-76, then silver producers seem to have reinvested in new processing plant alone some 42.2% of net silver production. This figure should not, of course, be regarded as anything but an approximation. Silver output may have been higher than that shown by the tax record, which is the source for the estimate just given. And the values of many ingenios shown in the Copia may be higher than their original building costs, owing to the inflation that accompanied the growth of silver output. (On the other hand, some ingenios had probably already been abandoned by the time of the Copia, as preference shifted towards more expensive and efficient plant; and the cost of such mills should clearly be considered part of total investment in plant, even though it cannot be known.) All in all, it would seem a reasonable guess to say that no less than a third of silver output from 1571 to 1576 was reinvested in new refining plant.
So the introduction of the amalgamation process into Potosi brought more than purely technological change. The process, by its nature, implied basic changes in the structure of the silver industry. The great advantage of amalgamation over smelting was the opportunity it gave for refining very large amounts of poor ore. This ore, however, had to be crushed before amalgamation could take place. Large and powerful mills were necessary for this trituration. The Indians who had previously dominated the actual production processes of silver before the 1570's possessed neither the technological knowledge nor the capital to build such machines. The Spaniards did have this expertise, and were able to gather sufficient capital in the early 70's to build simple man powered mills. These sufficed to create more investment capital. The larger and the more expensive the refining mills grew, the more firmly their Spanish owners took hold of silver refining; and the more firmly the Indian was excluded from it. Technical change, in the form of amalgamation, thus did much to oust the Indian from his central position of refiner, and therefore profit taker, in mining; and accordingly may have done as much as the draft labour schemes of Viceroy Toledo to transform the Indian in Potosi into a poorly paid forced worker.
